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A BREACH OF TRUST: 
ROCK-KOSHKONONG LAKE DISTRICT  
V. STATE DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL 
RESOURCES AND WISCONSIN’S PUBLIC 
TRUST DOCTRINE 
Wisconsin has a particularly notable tradition of using the public trust 
doctrine aggressively to protect the state’s natural resources.  The general 
thrust of the doctrine’s evolution in Wisconsin has been expansion beyond 
the doctrine’s traditional application to waters navigable for commercial 
purposes.  Emblematic of such expansion is the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court’s decision in Just v. Marinette County, which scholars have 
characterized as a landmark extension of the public trust doctrine to non-
navigable wetlands adjacent to navigable waters.  In light of this tradition, 
it is unsurprising that the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s recent 
pronouncement that the Department of Natural Resources lacked public 
trust jurisdiction to regulate privately-owned wetlands adjacent to a 
navigable lake provoked strong reactions, not only by commentators but 
also by certain members of the court.  This Comment asserts that the 
court’s opinion in Rock-Koshkonong Lake District v. State Department 
of Natural Resources mischaracterized 150 years of precedent and, in 
doing so, misconstrued Wisconsin’s public trust doctrine in a way that is 
potentially devastating to future use of the doctrine for environmental 
protection.  By subtly re-casting the court’s precedents as delimiting rather 
than expanding the state’s public trust jurisdiction, the Rock-Koshkonong 
opinion undermines the particular adaptability of Wisconsin’s public trust 
doctrine, which has allowed the doctrine to evolve along with societal 
values and public needs, and which, for decades, has situated Wisconsin 
as a leader in using the public trust doctrine for environmental protection. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
For nearly a decade, property owners along a 10,500-acre lake in 
Rock County, Wisconsin, have been engaged in a dispute with the 
Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources (WDNR) over what 
amounts to seven inches of water.1  Individuals and businesses who own 
property along Lake Koshkonong complain that low water levels on the 
lake, which is just seven feet deep at its deepest, diminish the beauty of 
their lakeside properties and limit their ability to recreate on the water.2  
In response, the WDNR, which controls the dam that regulates water 
levels on the lake, cites the adverse impact that higher water levels 
would have on the more than twelve miles of wetlands that surround the 
lake and sustain diverse wildlife and plant species.3  Against this 
backdrop, a 2005 WDNR denial of the Rock-Koshkonong Lake 
District’s request to raise water levels on Lake Koshkonong by 7.2 
inches sparked a battle that eventually reached the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court.4 
 
1.  Scott Bauer, Ruling Could Limit DNR Control Over Lake Levels, WIS. STATE J., July 
17, 2013, at A4.  
2.  Stacy Vogel, Public, Private Interests Collide in Koshkonong Case, GAZETTEXTRA 
(Feb. 20, 2008), http://gazettextra.com/news/2008/feb/20/public-private-interests-collide-koshk
onong-case/, archived at http://perma.cc/N4LW-AFZD. 
3.  Id. 
4.  Bauer, supra note 1. 
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In Rock-Koshkonong Lake District v. State Department of Natural 
Resources, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the WDNR properly 
considered the environmental impact that higher lake levels would have 
on surrounding, privately-owned wetlands, but failed to consider 
adequately the economic impact of lower lake levels on riparian 
property owners.5  Accordingly, the court remanded the case to the state 
circuit court for further proceedings.6  Despite the seeming triviality of 
the controversy, not to mention the lack of any final resolution to the 
dispute, the court’s decision in Rock-Koshkonong generated not only an 
outcry from environmentalists in the state but also a vigorous dissent 
from three members of the court.7  What provoked this response among 
environmental advocates and certain members of the court were 
statements in Justice Prosser’s majority opinion—arguably dicta—
regarding the scope of the WDNR’s authority under Wisconsin’s public 
trust doctrine.8  Specifically, while the court held that the WDNR 
possessed authority to consider the impact that higher lake levels would 
have on surrounding, privately-owned wetlands, the court emphasized 
that the WDNR exercised such authority pursuant to the state’s police 
powers rather than its public trust jurisdiction.9   
Courts and commentators have long acknowledged that Wisconsin 
has a particularly rich tradition of using the public trust doctrine 
aggressively to protect the state’s natural resources.10  In 1970, Professor 
 
5.  Rock-Koshkonong Lake Dist. v. State Dept. of Natural Res., 2013 WI 74, ¶¶ 11, 13, 
350 Wis. 2d 45, 833 N.W.2d 800. 
6.  Id. ¶ 14. 
7.  Patrick Marley, State Supreme Court Ruling in Lake-Level Case Stirs Concerns About 
Water Protections, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (July 17, 2013), http://www.jsonline.com/news/st
atepolitics/supreme-court-ruling-in-lake-level-case-impacts-public-trust-doctrine-b9955578z1-
215697151.html, archived at http://perma.cc/GL4D-3A4P. 
8.  Id.; see also Melissa K. Scanlan, It’s Not Open Season on Wetlands: A Lot of Verbiage 
but Not Much Changes for Public Trust Doctrine, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (July 22, 2013), 
http://www.jsonline.com/news/opinion/its-not-open-season-on-wetlands-b9959581z1-21652024
1.html, archived at http://perma.cc/L2ER-BCJK (noting the media attention given to the 
court’s discussion of the state’s public trust doctrine and identifying this discussion as dicta). 
9.  Rock-Koshkonong, 2013 WI 74, ¶ 11. 
10.  See, e.g., Diana Shooting Club v. Husting, 156 Wis. 261, 267, 145 N.W. 816, 818 
(1914) (“It will thus be seen that ever since the organization of the Northwest territory in 
1787 to the time of the adoption of our constitution the right to the free use of the navigable 
waters of the state has been jealously reserved . . . .”); Melissa Kwaterski Scanlan, Comment, 
The Evolution of the Public Trust Doctrine and the Degradation of Trust Resources: Courts, 
Trustees and Political Power in Wisconsin, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 135, 138 (2000) (“Wisconsin, a 
state containing over 1,200 lakes and bordered on the east and west by Lake Michigan and 
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Joseph Sax published what has come to be regarded as the seminal work 
on use of the public trust doctrine for environmental protection.11  
Professor Sax highlighted the doctrine’s application to natural resource 
protection in three states, including Wisconsin.12  Among the Wisconsin 
cases most frequently cited in connection with the public trust doctrine 
and its use for environmental protection is Just v. Marinette County, a 
1972 decision in which the Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld a 
shoreland zoning ordinance that restricted use of privately-owned 
wetlands due to the impact that such use would have on adjacent 
navigable waters.13  Scholars have consistently characterized this 
decision as a landmark extension of the public trust doctrine beyond its 
traditional application to navigable waters, subsequently enabling the 
state to regulate adjacent non-navigable waters, such as wetlands, 
pursuant to its public trust jurisdiction.14  
Within this context, reactions to the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s 
pronouncement in Rock-Koshkonong that the WDNR lacked authority 
pursuant to the state’s public trust jurisdiction to regulate privately-
owned wetlands adjacent to navigable waters are readily 
understandable.  The court’s pronouncement would seem, as Justice 
Crooks asserted in his dissent, to “undermine . . . [the] court’s 
precedent, recharacterize its holdings, and rewrite history.”15  Given this 
 
the Mississippi River, respectively, has a rich 150-year history of using the public trust 
doctrine to protect the natural heritage of the state.”).  
11.  See Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective 
Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970); see also Richard M. Frank, The Public 
Trust Doctrine: Assessing Its Recent Past & Charting Its Future, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 665, 
667 (2012) (describing Professor Sax’s article as the first to “identif[y] and propose[] the 
public trust doctrine as a key component of the then-new discipline of environmental law”).  
12.  Sax, supra note 11, at 509. 
13.  Just v. Marinette Cnty., 56 Wis. 2d 7, 26, 201 N.W.2d 761, 772 (1972). 
14.  See, e.g., Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property 
Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 745, 801 n.216 (2009); Jack H. Archer & Terrance W. Stone, The 
Interaction of the Public Trust and the “Takings” Doctrines: Protecting Wetlands and Critical 
Coastal Areas, 20 VT. L. REV. 81, 95 n.80 (1995); Michael C. Blumm & Aurora Paulsen, The 
Public Trust in Wildlife, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 1437, 1450 & n.108; Frank, supra note 11, at 668; 
Keith Hirokawa, Some Pragmatic Observations About Radical Critique in Environmental 
Law, 21 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 225, 274 n.217 (2002); Paul Sarahan, Wetlands Protection Post-
Lucas: Implications of the Public Trust Doctrine on Takings Analysis, 13 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 537, 
569–70 (1994); Gerald Torres & Nathan Bellinger, The Public Trust: The Law’s DNA, 
4 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 281, 286–87 & n.14 (2014); Michael L. Wolz, Comment, 
Applications of the Public Trust Doctrine to the Protection and Preservation of Wetlands: Can 
It Fill the Statutory Gaps?, 6 BYU J. PUB. L. 475, 494 (1992). 
15.  Rock-Koshkonong Lake Dist. v. State Dep’t of Natural Res., 2013 WI 74, ¶ 154, 350 
Wis. 2d 45, 833 N.W.2d 800 (Crooks, J., dissenting). 
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forceful statement by Justice Crooks, the question naturally arises: 
whose characterization of Wisconsin’s public trust doctrine—majority 
or dissent—is more faithful to the state’s heritage of aggressively 
executing its role as trustee of Wisconsin’s water resources? 
This Comment asserts that the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s decision 
in Rock-Koshkonong re-characterized 150 years of precedent and, in 
doing so, misconstrued Wisconsin’s public trust doctrine in a way that is 
potentially devastating to future use of the doctrine for environmental 
protection.16  Part II describes the dispute that gave rise to the Rock-
Koshkonong decision, the reasoning underlying the court’s holding, and 
the primary points of disagreement between the majority and the 
dissent.  This discussion highlights the divergent ways in which the 
majority and dissent in Rock-Koshkonong interpreted Wisconsin’s 
public trust doctrine.  Part III then provides a brief overview of 
Wisconsin’s public trust doctrine, including its historical origins, its 
statutory codification, and, in particular, its development through 
caselaw.  This overview suggests that the general thrust of the doctrine’s 
evolution in Wisconsin has been continuous expansion beyond the 
doctrine’s traditional application to waters navigable for commercial 
purposes.  Emblematic of such expansion is the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court’s decision in Just v. Marinette County.   
Against this backdrop, Part IV critically assesses the competing 
conceptions of the doctrine that the majority and dissent advanced in 
Rock-Koshkonong.  In particular, Part IV demonstrates that the 
majority subtly but substantially re-characterized the court’s precedents 
as delimiting rather than expanding the scope of the public trust 
doctrine.  On the basis of this re-characterization, the majority 
incorrectly concluded that Just stands for the proposition that the state 
may regulate non-navigable wetlands adjacent to navigable waters only 
pursuant to its police powers, not its public trust jurisdiction.  While the 
dissent correctly noted that this conclusion runs contrary to the plain 
language of Just, both the majority and the dissent failed to recognize 
that this distinction is logically untenable in light of the court’s holding 
in Just. 
 
16.  Other early scholarly commentary on Rock-Koshkonong is similarly critical of the 
decision’s characterization of precedent but more narrowly focused on the Rock-Koshkonong 
majority’s treatment of Just in particular, as opposed to its interpretation of the state’s public 
trust doctrine more broadly speaking.  See generally Christian Eickelberg, Rock-Koshkonong 
Lake District and the Surprising Narrowing of Wisconsin’s Public Trust Doctrine, 16 VT. J. 
ENVTL. L. 38 (2014). 
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Part V then considers reactions to the Rock-Koshkonong decision, 
both among members of the public and within the legal community.  
This Part asserts that many commentators, including critics, do not fully 
appreciate the decision’s implications for continued use of the public 
trust doctrine as a tool for protecting Wisconsin’s natural resources.  
Finally, Part VI concludes. 
II. ROCK-KOSHKONONG LAKE DISTRICT V. STATE DEPARTMENT OF 
NATURAL RESOURCES 
In July 2013, the Wisconsin Supreme Court addressed an ongoing 
dispute between the Rock-Koshkonong Lake District and the WDNR 
regarding water levels on Lake Koshkonong.17  While the court’s 
decision did little to resolve the actual dispute, it did generate a 
significant amount of controversy due to the court’s treatment of the 
state’s public trust doctrine.18  Specifically, Justice Prosser’s majority 
opinion and Justice Crook’s dissent set forth characterizations of the 
court’s public trust precedents that are diametrically opposed,19 leading 
many to view the decision as a cross-roads for the doctrine’s future in 
Wisconsin.20 
A. Lake Koshkonong, the Rock River, and the Indianford Dam 
Lake Koshkonong is a large but shallow inland lake located 
primarily in Jefferson County.21  A “natural widening of the Rock 
River,” the lake is situated approximately “four miles downstream from 
the City of Fort Atkinson.”22  With a surface area of approximately 
10,460 acres, it is the sixth largest inland lake in Wisconsin, but its 
average depth is a mere five feet, with its deepest point being only about 
seven feet.23  Due to the gradual descent of the lake’s shoreline into 
deeper water, water depths of only one to two feet extend as far as 
“hundreds of feet into the lake.”24 
 
17.  See infra Part II.B. 
18.  See supra note 7 and accompanying text.   
19.  See infra Part II.C. 
20.  See infra Part V. 
21.  Lake Koshkonong and the Indianford Dam, Case No. 3-SC-2003-28-3100LR, at 4–5 
(Dep’t of Natural Res. Dec. 1, 2006) [hereinafter Lake Koshkonong Review] (review of 
decision). 
22.  Id. at 4. 
23.  Id. at 5. 
24.  Id. 
 2015] A BREACH OF TRUST 1473 
With approximately twenty-seven miles of shoreline, Lake 
Koshkonong is currently surrounded by a combination of residential 
and commercial properties, as well as undeveloped wetlands.25  The 
coverage of the riparian wetlands is between 3,000 and 4,000 acres.26  
Within this area are submerged aquatic beds, deep as well as shallow or 
emergent marsh, wet meadows, and floodplain forests, among other 
types of wetlands.27  One of the largest wetlands surrounding Lake 
Koshkonong is the state-owned Koshkonong Wildlife Area, which is 
comprised of approximately 715 acres of shallow marsh and wet 
meadow.28  Other riparian wetlands are owned by private parties such as 
the Carcajou Shooting Club and the Crescent Bay Hunt Club.29 
In 1843, the Wisconsin Territorial Legislature authorized 
construction of a dam across the Rock River approximately six miles 
upstream of Lake Koshkonong.30  Since its construction, the dam’s 
owners have included the Wisconsin Power & Light Co. and, from 
December 1965 until December 2004, Rock County.31  In December 
2004, the county conveyed ownership of the dam to the Rock-
Koshkonong Lake District, “a public inland lake protection and 
rehabilitation district,” which presently owns and operates the dam.32  
The effect of the Indianford Dam is to alter upstream water levels on 
the Rock River and Lake Koshkonong.33  While the initial authorization 
for the dam’s construction included a provision prohibiting alterations in 
flowage that resulted in flooding of privately owned land without the 
owner’s consent,34 several modifications to the dam’s structure between 
1900 and 1910 raised water levels on Lake Koshkonong, leading to 
administrative appeals by property owners whose land flooded as a 
result.35 
 
25.  Id. 
26.  Id. 
27.  Id. at 9. 
28.  Id. 
29.  Id. at 10.  
30.  Lake Koshkonong and the Indianford Dam, Case No. 3-SC-2003-28-3100LR, ¶¶ 4–
5 (Dep’t of Natural Res. Apr. 15, 2005) [hereinafter Lake Koshkonong Decision] (decision). 
31.  Lake Koshkonong Review, supra note 21, at 6. 
32.  Id. at 3.  
33.  Id. at 1.  
34.  Id. at 5.  
35.  Lake Koshkonong Decision, supra note 30, ¶¶ 6–7. 
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As a consequence of these disputes, the Wisconsin Railroad 
Commission36 “issued the first water level order for the Indianford Dam 
in 1919.”37  In 1939, the Public Service Commission of Wisconsin, which 
was the predecessor state agency to the WDNR, denied a request by 
over one hundred area landowners to raise the mandated maximum 
water level by six inches.38  The Commission cited the objections of 
owners of low-lying properties and farms that would be subject to 
flooding as a result of raising water levels.39  
The 1919 water level order remained unchanged until 1982, when 
the WDNR issued a new order pursuant to its statutory authority.40  
While this order was contested, the compromise order issued in 1991 set 
the water levels for Lake Koshkonong at their current range.41  The 
WDNR’s primary concern in setting maximum water levels for Lake 
Koshkonong in its 1991 order was the degradation of the wetlands 
surrounding the lake due to increased water levels since construction of 
the Indianford Dam.42  According to the WDNR, “The most important 
ecological change for Lake Koshkonong has been the loss of wetlands 
and submergent plants. . . .  [This loss] has resulted from the 
maintenance of higher water levels, increased nutrient loads from the 
watershed, and the introduction of common carp into the system.”43  
Nonetheless, due to the Indianford Dam falling into general disrepair 
between 1960 and 2001, lake levels consistently remained above the 
maximum set by the 1991 WDNR order and furthermore increased 
steadily over time.44 
 
36.  The Wisconsin legislature initially charged the Wisconsin Railroad Commission with 
oversight of water levels at the Indianford Dam.  Rock-Koshkonong Lake Dist. v. State Dep’t 
of Natural Res., 2013 WI 74, ¶ 24 n.8, 350 Wis. 2d 45, 833 N.W.2d 800.  Subsequently, the 
Public Service Commission and later the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources 
assumed responsibility for issuing water level orders under Wisconsin Statutes section 
31.02(1).  Id. 
37.  Id. ¶ 25; Lake Koshkonong Decision, supra note 30, ¶ 7. 
38.  Lake Koshkonong Review, supra note 21, at 6.  
39.  Id. 
40.  Rock-Koshkonong, 2013 WI 74, ¶ 25. 
41.  Id. ¶ 28. 
42.  Lake Koshkonong Review, supra note 21, at 10 (noting that, “[i]n 1982, the DNR 
documented the loss of 52 acres of shoreline occurring between 1950 and 1963, and an 
additional 270 acres between 1963 and 1975”). 
43.  Lake Koshkonong Decision, supra note 30, ¶ 49. 
44.  Lake Koshkonong Review, supra note 21, at 7. 
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B. The Dispute 
The dispute at the center of the Rock-Koshkonong decision arose as 
a result of repairs made to the Indianford Dam in 2002, which restored 
the dam to its full operating capacity and subsequently brought Lake 
Koshkonong water levels down to their lowest point since the 1930s but 
also more in line with the levels set by the WDNR’s 1991 order.45  On 
April 21, 2003, the Rock-Koshkonong Lake District filed a petition 
requesting that the WDNR raise water levels on Lake Koshkonong by 
approximately eight inches during the winter months and by over one 
foot during the summer months.46  
In its petition, the District cited concerns about the impact of lower 
lake levels on recreational activities on the lake.47  A District survey of 
riparian property owners conducted in 2000 strongly suggested that a 
majority of both residential and commercial property owners on or near 
Lake Koshkonong believed that higher water levels would increase their 
use and enjoyment of their properties, allowing, among other things, for 
riparian property owners to maintain shorter piers to reach water depths 
capable of supporting boats.48 
After conducting an Environmental Assessment, as required by the 
Wisconsin Administrative Code, the WDNR issued a decision on April 
15, 2005, granting certain requested changes in water levels during the 
winter months but denying the District’s petition to raise water levels 
during the summer months.49  In its decision, the WDNR acknowledged 
the benefits that higher summer water levels would have for riparian 
property owners with regard to the use of boats and shorter pier 
lengths.50  The WDNR found, however, that raising summer water levels 
on Lake Koshkonong would have substantial negative effects on 
surrounding wetlands.51  Citing its statutory authority to regulate and 
control water levels, the WDNR concluded that granting the District’s 
petition to raise summer water levels on Lake Koshkonong would be 
“inconsistent with the interest of public rights in Lake Koshkonong and 
 
45.  Rock-Koshkonong, 2013 WI 74, ¶ 27. 
46.  Lake Koshkonong Review, supra note 21, at 4. 
47.  Rock-Koshkonong, 2013 WI 74, ¶ 27. 
48.  Lake Koshkonong Review, supra note 21, at 22. 
49.  Id. at 4. 
50.  Lake Koshkonong Decision, supra note 30, ¶ 16. 
51.  Id. ¶¶ 17–24. 
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the Rock River and would not promote safety or protect life, health or 
property.”52 
In response to the WDNR’s decision, the District, together with the 
Rock River–Koshkonong Association, Inc., and the Lake Koshkonong 
Recreation Association, Inc., petitioned the WDNR for a contested 
hearing.53  The WDNR granted this request, and on December 1, 2006, 
an administrative law judge sustained the WDNR’s decision.54  In 
particular, the agency decision concluded that “[t]he great weight of the 
evidence support[ed] the DNR’s 2005 order and decision to maintain 
‘summer’ water levels at the levels set in 1991 . . . as being ‘in the 
interest of public rights in navigable waters’ and ‘to promote safety and 
protect, life, health and property.’”55 
Following unsuccessful appeal of the agency decision to the Rock 
County Circuit Court and Wisconsin Court of Appeals,56 the District 
petitioned the Wisconsin Supreme Court for review, which the court 
granted.57  
C. The Wisconsin Supreme Court’s Decision 
On review, the Wisconsin Supreme Court considered four issues: (1) 
“what level of deference . . . should be accorded to the . . . [WDNR’s] 
conclusions of law”; (2) whether the WDNR had “exceed[ed] its 
authority in making a water level determination” on the basis of the 
assessed impact that water levels would have on adjacent, privately-
owned wetlands; (3) whether the WDNR had exceeded its authority by 
considering the Wisconsin Administrative Code’s wetland water quality 
standards when making its water level determination; and (4) whether 
the WDNR had erred in “refusing to consider the impact[] of water 
levels on residential property values, business income, and public 
revenue.”58 
 
52.  Id. ¶ 51. 
53.  Lake Koshkonong Review, supra note 21, at 1. 
54.  Id. at 1, 31. 
55.  Id. at 29 (quoting WIS. STAT. § 31.02(1) (2003–2004)). 
56.  See generally Rock-Koshkonong Lake Dist. v. State Dep’t of Natural Res., 2011 WI 
App 115, 336 Wis. 2d 677, 803 N.W.2d 853. 
57.  Order Granting Petition for Review of Rosh-Koshkonong Lake Dist. v. DNR, 339 
Wis. 2d 734, 810 N.W.2d 221 (unpublished table order). 
58.  Rock-Koshkonong Lake Dist. v. State Dep’t of Natural Res., 2013 WI 74, ¶¶ 4–8, 
350 Wis. 2d 45, 833 N.W.2d 800. 
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Of these four issues, only the second is germane to the present 
discussion.  Although the court held that the WDNR possessed 
statutory authority to consider the impact that raising lake levels would 
have on adjacent, privately-owned wetlands, Justice Prosser, writing for 
the court, discussed at length the conclusion that the WDNR lacked 
such authority under Wisconsin’s public trust doctrine as enshrined in 
the state’s constitution, implemented in the state’s statutory scheme, and 
interpreted by the court’s earlier decisions.59  It was, in large part, this 
discussion that provoked Justice Crooks’s highly critical dissent, which 
two other members of the court joined.60  
1. Majority  
The majority began its discussion of the WDNR’s authority to 
consider the impact of lake levels on adjacent, privately-owned wetlands 
by noting that the agency decision confirming the WDNR order 
explicitly identified Wisconsin’s public trust doctrine as the source of the 
WDNR’s authority.61  The majority further noted that, in its brief to the 
court, the District specifically argued that the WDNR had exceeded its 
authority under the public trust doctrine when it considered the impact 
of lake levels on adjacent, privately-owned wetlands.62  On these 
grounds, the majority launched into a lengthy discussion of Wisconsin’s 
public trust doctrine, including its constitutional and statutory bases, 
and, in particular, the evolution of the doctrine through the court’s 
precedents.63 
The majority cited Article IX, Section 1 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution as the basis for the state’s regulatory authority, noting that 
the constitution “commands that the state hold navigable waters in trust 
 
59.  Id. ¶ 11. 
60.  Id. ¶¶ 153, 189 (Crooks, J., dissenting).  The dissenting justices also disagreed with 
the majority on the issue of whether the WDNR erred in excluding evidence of the secondary 
economic impact of water levels from its consideration, which formed the basis for the court’s 
decision to remand the case to the state circuit court for further proceedings.  Id. ¶ 152 
(majority opinion); id. ¶ 155 (Crooks, J., dissenting). 
61.  Id. ¶ 67 (majority opinion) (citing to the paragraph in the agency decision that 
identifies “the public trust doctrine as authority for the DNR to regulate wetlands and near 
shorelands, wildlife habitat, and scenic beauty”). 
62.  Id. ¶ 65 (“The District is also concerned about the application of the public trust 
doctrine to any wetlands that are not navigable in fact unless those wetlands are below the 
[ordinary high-water marks].  The District asserts that the DNR’s position significantly 
expands the scope of the DNR’s public trust jurisdiction.”).  
63.  Id. ¶ 69. 
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for the public.”64  The majority went on to acknowledge that the court’s 
prior decisions had interpreted this directive broadly to recognize “more 
than just commercial navigability rights.”65  Rather, the state’s public 
trust doctrine affords protection even for “purely recreational purposes 
such as boating, swimming, fishing, hunting, . . . and . . . preserv[ing] 
scenic beauty.”66 
Despite this expansive interpretation of the rights secured to the 
public under Wisconsin’s public trust doctrine, the majority explained, 
the state’s regulatory jurisdiction under the doctrine has always been 
strictly confined to a limited geographic area—to navigable waters 
between the boundaries of the ordinary high-water marks.67  On this 
basis, the majority concluded that the WDNR lacked authority to 
consider the impact of lake levels on adjacent, privately-owned wetlands 
pursuant to its public trust jurisdiction because the wetlands surrounding 
Lake Koshkonong are neither navigable nor below the original high-
water marks of the lake.68 
The primary concern that more expansive exercise of the state’s 
public trust authority would raise, according to the majority, involves 
questions of ownership.69  As the majority explained, 
Contemplating the question of ownership is important because 
the public trust doctrine implicates state ownership or virtual 
state ownership—by virtue of its trust responsibility—of land 
under navigable waters.  If the public trust were extended to 
cover wetlands that are not navigable, it would create significant 
questions about ownership of and trespass on private land, and it 
would be difficult to cabin expansion of the state’s new 
constitutionally based jurisdiction over private land.70 
 
64.  Id. ¶ 71. 
65.  Id. ¶ 72. 
66.  Id. (alterations in original) (quoting R.W. Docks & Slips v. State, 2001 WI 73, ¶ 19, 
244 Wis. 2d 497, 628 N.W.2d 781) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
67.  Id. ¶¶ 76, 91 (citing Muench v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 261 Wis. 492, 506, 53 N.W.2d 
514, 519 (1952); Diana Shooting Club v. Husting, 156 Wis. 261, 272, 145 N.W. 816, 820 
(1914)).  The test for whether a body of water is “navigable” is whether it is “navigable in fact 
for any purpose.”  Muench, 261 Wis. at 505–06 (emphasis omitted) (quoting WIS. STAT. 
§ 30.01(1) (1951)).  “Ordinary high-water marks” refer to the distinct marks that the 
continuous presence of water leaves on the shoreline or bank.  Diana Shooting Club, 156 Wis. 
at 272. 
68.  Rock-Koshkonong, 2013 WI 74, ¶¶ 77, 93. 
69.  Id. ¶¶ 77–78. 
70.  Id. ¶ 84 (emphasis omitted). 
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Because the public trust doctrine vests ownership of land beneath 
navigable bodies of water in the state, allowing the WDNR to consider 
the impact of lake levels on surrounding wetlands pursuant to its public 
trust jurisdiction would, in the majority’s view, call into question the 
ownership of such wetlands.71 
Critical to the majority’s conclusion that the WDNR lacked 
authority to consider the impact of lake levels on adjacent, privately-
owned wetlands pursuant to its public trust jurisdiction was its treatment 
of Just v. Marinette County, in which the court dealt explicitly with the 
state’s authority to regulate privately-owned wetlands adjacent to a 
navigable lake.72  As the majority explained, Just upheld a shoreland 
zoning ordinance that required a permit for the filling of wetlands on 
privately-owned property adjacent to a navigable lake as an exercise of 
the state’s police powers, not its public trust authority.73  The majority 
based this interpretation primarily on the fact that, in Just, the property 
to which the zoning ordinance applied extended 1,000 feet beyond the 
ordinary high-water marks of any navigable body of water.74  
Accordingly, the majority stated, “It should be obvious that the state 
does not have constitutional public trust jurisdiction to regulate land a 
distance of more than three football fields away from a navigable lake or 
pond.”75 
On the basis of this analysis, the majority held that the WDNR 
possessed statutory authority to consider the impact of lake levels on 
adjacent, privately-owned wetlands under Wisconsin Statutes section 
31.02(1), but that such authority existed pursuant only to the state’s 
police powers.76  Essential to this holding was the majority’s 
construction of Wisconsin Statutes section 31.02(1) as codifying only in 
 
71.  Id.  
72.  Just v. Marinette Cnty., 56 Wis. 2d 7, 12–13, 201 N.W.2d 761, 766 (1972).  As the 
dissenting justices in Rock-Koshkonong noted, scholars have frequently cited Just as 
extending the state’s public trust jurisdiction to non-navigable waters above the ordinary 
high-water marks.  Rock-Koshkonong, 2013 WI 74, ¶ 170 n.4 (Crooks, J., dissenting); see also 
supra note 14 and accompanying text.  As such, it was essential to the majority’s reasoning 
that it redefined Just as an exercise of the state’s police power as opposed to its public trust 
jurisdiction, an interpretation of Just that is ultimately unconvincing.  See infra Part IV.B. 
73.  Rock-Koshkonong, 2013 WI 74, ¶ 96. 
74.  Id. ¶ 100. 
75.  Id.  
76.  Id. ¶¶ 109–10 (“The DNR may emphasize some rights over others in its water level 
determinations, and its exercise of discretion will normally be upheld so long as it considers 
all property rights and so long as it does not accord some non-navigable land or water above 
the [ordinary high-water marks] a constitutional preference as trust land . . . .”). 
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part the state’s public trust doctrine.77  Specifically, the majority focused 
on the disjunctive “or” in section 31.02(1) as authorizing regulation in 
part pursuant to the state’s public trust jurisdiction (regulation “in the 
interest of public rights in navigable waters”) and in part pursuant to the 
state’s police powers (regulation “to promote safety and protect life, 
health and property”).78  The implications of this distinction in the 
context of the Lake Koshkonong dispute are, from the majority’s 
perspective, clear:  
[T]he distinction between the DNR’s constitutionally based 
public trust authority and the DNR’s police power-based 
statutory authority is that the latter is subject to constitutional 
and statutory protections afforded to property, may be modified 
from time to time by the legislature, and requires some balancing 
of competing interests in enforcement.79 
2. Dissent 
Three justices dissented from the judgment remanding the case to 
the state circuit court for further proceedings consistent with the holding 
that the WDNR may not exclude evidence of the secondary economic 
impact of lake levels on adjacent property owners.80  While the 
dissenting justices agreed with the majority’s conclusion that the WDNR 
possessed authority to consider the impact of lake levels on adjacent, 
privately-owned wetlands under Wisconsin Statutes section 31.02(1), 
they strongly disagreed with the majority’s discussion of the limitations 
of the state’s public trust jurisdiction.81  In this regard, the dissent’s 
criticisms of the majority opinion were twofold: (1) that the present 
controversy could be (and was) resolved through statutory construction 
alone, without the need to reach the constitutional issue of the scope of 
the state’s public trust doctrine; and (2) that the majority needlessly 
raised the public trust doctrine in a way that mischaracterized the 
court’s precedent and significantly weakened the doctrine as enshrined 
 
77.  Id. ¶ 102. 
78.  Id. ¶ 103 (quoting WIS. STAT. § 31.02(1) (2009–2010)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
79.  Id. ¶ 101. 
80.  Id. ¶¶ 153, 155, 189 (Crooks, J., dissenting).  
81.  Id. ¶¶ 153–54. 
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in the Wisconsin Constitution.82  The consequence, according to the 
dissent, is “a significant and disturbing shift in Wisconsin law.”83 
The dissent’s statutory argument is simple: based on the plain 
language of Wisconsin Statutes section 31.02(1), the WDNR has clear 
authority to consider the impact that water levels on Lake Koshkonong 
will have on adjacent, privately-owned wetlands.84  As the dissent 
acknowledged, the majority did not dispute this assertion85; what the 
majority did dispute was the source of authority that this statutory 
provision embodies.86  The dissent thus went on to argue that the 
majority’s interpretation of Wisconsin Statutes section 31.02(1) as 
codifying only in part the state’s public trust doctrine was a novel 
interpretation without support in the court’s precedents.87 
The dissent took issue with the majority’s characterization of the 
court’s public trust precedents in general and with its treatment of Just 
in particular.  Specifically, the dissent argued that the overall thrust of 
the court’s precedents had been expansion of the state’s public trust 
jurisdiction, with Just standing for the proposition that the state may 
regulate non-navigable waters to the extent that such waters affect 
adjacent navigable waters.88  By re-characterizing Just as an exercise of 
the state’s police powers rather than its public trust jurisdiction, the 
majority, in the words of the dissent, “untethers our constitutional 
jurisprudence from its foundation and attempts to transform 165 years 
 
82.  Id. ¶¶ 154, 168 (“Instead of limiting itself to addressing only what must be 
addressed, the majority seizes this opportunity to limit the public trust doctrine in an 
unforeseen way, transforming the state’s affirmative duty to protect the public trust into a 
legislative choice.”). 
83.  Id. ¶ 154. 
84.  Id. ¶ 167 (“Both the majority and the petitioner agree that a simple reading of 
§ 31.02(1) demonstrates that the statute allows for consideration of private wetlands.”).  
Wisconsin Statutes section 31.02(1) provides, in relevant part, that the DNR, “in the interest 
of public rights in navigable waters or to promote safety and protect life, health and property 
may regulate and control the level and flow of water in all navigable waters . . . .”  WIS. STAT. 
§ 31.02(1) (2013–2014).  As the majority in Rock-Koshkonong notes, the District did not 
contest that privately owned wetlands adjacent to Lake Koshkonong constitute “property” 
subject to regulation within the meaning of the statute.  Rock Koshkonong, 2013 WI 74, 
¶ 109.  The majority thus concludes, “There can be no dispute that the DNR can consider 
water level impact on all adjacent property under Wis. Stat. § 31.02(1).”  Id. (emphasis 
added). 
85.  Rock-Koshkonong, 2013 WI 74, ¶ 167 (Crooks, J., dissenting).  
86.  See supra Part II.C.1. 
87.  Rock-Koshkonong, 2013 WI 74, ¶ 168 (Crooks, J., dissenting).  
88.  Id. ¶¶ 164–65.  
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of constitutional precedent into a mere legislative exercise of the state’s 
police power.”89 
3. Divergent Interpretations of Wisconsin’s Public Trust Doctrine 
The fundamental disagreement between the majority and the dissent 
in Rock-Koshkonong thus concerned how the court’s public trust 
precedents should be characterized.  The majority relied on Diana 
Shooting Club v. Husting90 and Muench v. Public Service Commission91 
to define the public trust doctrine as applying only to navigable bodies 
of water up to the ordinary high-water mark.92  In this context, the 
majority concluded that Just could not have upheld the shoreland zoning 
ordinances at issue in that case pursuant to the state’s public trust 
jurisdiction because the shoreland in question did not fall within the 
ordinary high-water marks of a navigable body of water.93  By contrast, 
the dissent viewed Just as the culmination of a series of earlier decisions 
expanding the public trust doctrine beyond its initial application to 
waters navigable for commercial purposes only.94  In assessing the Rock-
Koshkonong decision, then, the fundamental question that arises is 
which side—majority or dissent—set forth a more plausible 
interpretation of the state’s public trust doctrine?  
III. WISCONSIN’S PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE 
At its most basic level, the public trust doctrine “provides that 
certain natural resources are held by the government in a special 
status—in ‘trust’—for current and future generations.”95  The origins of 
the public trust doctrine are ancient, traceable to Roman law that 
defined certain types of property, including the sea, seashore, and rivers, 
as permanently preserved for public use due to the particularly public 
benefits like navigation and fishing that are derived from such 
 
89.  Id. ¶ 166. 
90.  156 Wis. 261, 145 N.W. 816 (1914). 
91.  261 Wis. 492, 53 N.W.2d 514 (1952). 
92.  Rock-Koshkonong, 2013 WI 74, ¶ 86.  
93.  See supra notes 74–75 and accompanying text. 
94.  Rock-Koshkonong, 2013 WI 74, ¶¶ 160–61 (Crooks, J., dissenting) (noting the 
“growth of the public trust doctrine over time” with reference to Diana Shooting Club, 
Muench, and Just).   
95.  Frank, supra note 11, at 667. 
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property.96  Under English common law, the monarch held title to the 
land beneath any waters influenced by the tide to preserve for the public 
a right to navigation and fishing on such waters.97  The so-called 
“lodestar” in American public trust law is Illinois Central Railroad Co. 
v. Illinois,98 in which the United States Supreme Court provided the 
foundational articulation of the public trust doctrine in the United 
States.99  Specifically, the Court in Illinois Central Railroad Co. affirmed 
the American common law principle that the state holds title to the land 
beneath navigable bodies of water, including inland bodies of water not 
affected by the tide, to preserve the public rights to navigation, 
commerce, and fishing on such waters.100   
Notwithstanding this “lodestar,” the public trust doctrine has 
evolved along lines distinct to each state.101  In Phillips Petroleum Co. v. 
Mississippi, the Supreme Court expressly recognized that states possess 
authority to define the limits of their respective public trust doctrines.102  
In exercising this latitude, states have largely tended to expand on the 
doctrine as defined in Illinois Central Railroad Co., often by extending 
the geographic scope of the doctrine’s applicability and by recognizing 
public uses protected under the doctrine beyond the rights to 
navigation, commerce, and fishing.103  Wisconsin has consistently been at 
 
96.  Sax, supra note 11, at 475.  For further discussion of the origins of the public trust 
doctrine in Roman and English law, see id. at 475–78; Jeffrey W. Henquinet & Tracy Dobson, 
The Public Trust Doctrine and Sustainable Ecosystems: A Great Lakes Fisheries Case Study, 
14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 322, 324–26 (2006). 
97.  See Henquinet & Dobson, supra note 96, 325–29. 
98.  146 U.S. 387 (1892). 
99.  Id. at 452; Sax, supra note 11, at 489.  For an in-depth examination of Illinois Central 
Railroad Co. and its role in defining the public trust doctrine in the United States, see 
generally Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Origins of the American Public Trust 
Doctrine: What Really Happened in Illinois Central, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 799 (2004). 
100.  Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 452; see also Henquinet & Dobson, supra note 96, 
328–29; Sax, supra note 11, at 489–90. 
101.  Henquinet & Dobson, supra note 96, at 323 (noting that “fairly substantial 
differences exist in the interpretation of the doctrine between jurisdictions even given guiding 
light cases like Illinois Central”); Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Western 
States’ Public Trust Doctrines: Public Values, Private Rights, and the Evolution Toward an 
Ecological Public Trust, 37 ECOLOGY L.Q. 53, 55–56 (2010) (emphasizing that “the states 
have progressed and diverged in interesting ways beyond the precepts of the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s seminal discussion of the public trust doctrine in Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. 
Illinois”).  
102.  Phillips Petrol. Co. v. Miss., 484 U.S. 469, 475 (1988). 
103.  See David L. Callies & J. David Breemer, Selected Legal and Policy Trends in 
Takings Law: Background Principles, Custom and Public Trust “Exceptions” and the (Mis)use 
of Investment-Backed Expectations, 36 VAL. U. L. REV. 339, 357 (2002) (“In the last thirty 
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the forefront of this expansion, particularly with respect to defining 
navigability in more expansive terms and recognizing additional rights 
preserved to the public under the doctrine.104  The state’s public trust 
doctrine is thus best characterized as not only expansive but also elastic, 
capable of being stretched to address changing social norms and 
emergent public concerns.105 
A. Origins of the Public Trust Doctrine in Wisconsin 
Wisconsin’s public trust doctrine originated in the Northwest 
Ordinance of 1787, whereby the Virginia legislature ceded control of the 
 
years, many state courts have expanded the geographical reach and substantive scope of the 
public trust doctrine.  In particular, a spate of recent decisions have extended it to cover 
resources beyond navigable waterways, while also finding that the trust protects public uses in 
such resources other than the traditional triad of commerce, navigation, and fishing.”); Robin 
Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Eastern Public Trust Doctrines: Classifications of 
States, Property Rights, and State Summaries, 16 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 11 (2007) (noting 
the ability of states to “expand upon the federal public trust doctrine” and the ways in which 
they have done so); Alexandra B. Klass, Modern Public Trust Principles: Recognizing Rights 
and Integrating Standards, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 699, 705 (2006) (citing Phillips Petroleum 
Co. as “allowing states a wide berth to expand the [public trust] doctrine’s protection beyond 
a federal minimum”). 
104.  Craig, supra note 103, at 18–19 (“Wisconsin’s already broad public trust doctrine is 
potentially even broader, because the Wisconsin Supreme Court stated in 1952 that the public 
can use the public trust waters for navigation, hunting, fishing, recreation ‘or any other lawful 
purpose.’” (quoting Muench v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 261 Wis. 492, 506, 53 N.W.2d 514, 519 
(1952))); Bertram C. Frey & Andrew Mutz, The Public Trust in Surface Waterways and 
Submerged Lands of the Great Lakes States, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 907, 942–43 (2007) 
(“Of all the Great Lakes states, Wisconsin’s public trust doctrine is the most expansive in 
scope.”); id. at 914–15 (“Wisconsin courts have been leaders in applying a very broad 
definition of navigability, which includes streams capable of floating a recreational boat of the 
shallowest draft, certain artificial waters connected to navigable waters, and, in some 
instances, non-navigable streams that impact navigable waters.”); Henquinet & Dobson, 
supra note 96, at 352 (“Wisconsin probably has the strongest public trust doctrine in the 
[Great Lakes] basin . . . .”). 
105.  Because the focus of the present discussion is on the Rock-Koshkonong decision 
and its interpretation of Wisconsin’s public trust doctrine, this Comment takes no position on 
whether an expansive public trust doctrine is normatively desirable.  It is worth noting, 
however, that the topic has received considerable scholarly attention, particularly in the wake 
of Professor Sax’s call for liberal application of the doctrine for environmental protection.  
See Sax, supra note 11, at 556–57 (calling for application of the public trust doctrine beyond 
its “quite narrow” traditional scope).  For a critical discussion of expansion of the public trust 
doctrine, see generally James L. Huffman, Speaking of Inconvenient Truths—A History of the 
Public Trust Doctrine, 18 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 1 (2007). For a response to Professor 
Huffman’s criticisms that acknowledges the doctrine’s expansion beyond its traditional scope 
but defends such expansion as a useful means of filling regulatory gaps, see generally Hope 
M. Babcock, Essay, The Public Trust Doctrine: What a Tall Tale They Tell, 61 S.C. L. REV. 
393 (2009).  
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Northwest Territory on two conditions: (1) that the states newly 
admitted to the Union would be sovereign entities to the same extent as 
the original members of the Union; and (2) that the navigable waters 
connected with the Mississippi and St. Lawrence rivers would be 
permanently and freely accessible to the public.106  Wisconsin, which was 
located within the Northwest Territory, was admitted to the Union as a 
state in 1848 and, upon admission, directly adopted the language of the 
Northwest Ordinance as Article IX of the Wisconsin Constitution.107  
Specifically, Section 1 of Article IX provides:  
The state shall have concurrent jurisdiction on all rivers and 
lakes bordering on this state so far as such rivers or lakes shall 
form a common boundary to the state and any other state or 
territory now or hereafter to be formed, and bounded by the 
same; and the river Mississippi and the navigable waters leading 
into the Mississippi and St. Lawrence, and the carrying places 
between the same, shall be common highways and forever free, 
as well to the inhabitants of the state as to the citizens of the 
United States, without any tax, impost or duty therefor.108 
On this constitutional basis, the Wisconsin legislature, the WDNR, and 
the Wisconsin Supreme Court have, over the past 150 years, defined the 
contours of the state’s public trust doctrine.109 
 
106.  Muench, 261 Wis. at 499.  The Northwest Ordinance provided, in relevant part: 
The navigable waters leading into the Mississippi and St. Lawrence, and the carrying 
places between the same, shall be common highways, and forever free, as well to the 
inhabitants of the said territory, as to the citizens of the United States, and those of 
any other states that may be admitted into the confederacy, without any tax, impost 
or duty therefor. 
Diana Shooting Club v. Husting, 156 Wis. 261, 266–67, 145 N.W. 816, 818 (1914) (quoting An 
Ordinance for the Government of the Territory of the United States North-West of the River 
Ohio, art. 4 (1787), as adopted by An Act to Provide for the Government of the Territory 
North-West of the River Ohio, 1 Stat. 50, 52 n.a (1789)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
107.  Muench, 261 Wis. at 499–500. 
108.  WIS. CONST. art. IX, § 1.  
109.  See Scanlan, supra note 10, at 138 (describing the “three state institutions [that] 
have been instrumental in defining the scope of public rights and the responsibility of the 
state trustee” in Wisconsin). 
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B. Codification of the Public Trust Doctrine in Wisconsin Statutes 
Under the state’s public trust doctrine, the Wisconsin legislature is 
the primary trustee of the state’s water resources.110  The Wisconsin 
Supreme Court has defined the legislature’s obligations under the public 
trust doctrine as an affirmative duty to not only safeguard but also 
enhance the public’s rights in the state’s navigable waters: “[T]he trust, 
being both active and administrative, requires the law-making body to 
act in all cases where action is necessary, not only to preserve the trust 
but to promote it.”111  Accordingly, the legislature has passed a series of 
statutes that regulate use of the state’s navigable waters and delegate 
enforcement to the WDNR.112  Chapter 30 of the Wisconsin Statutes, 
which governs “navigable waters, harbors and navigation,”113 “embodies 
a system of regulation of Wisconsin’s navigable waters pursuant to the 
public trust doctrine” and “delegate[s] to the DNR broad authority to 
regulate under the public trust doctrine.”114  Similarly, Chapter 31 of the 
Wisconsin Statutes regulates dams and bridges affecting navigable 
waters and likewise delegates administration of these regulations to the 
WDNR.115  
C. Development of the Public Trust Doctrine Through Caselaw 
Scholars have long acknowledged Wisconsin to have a particularly 
well-developed body of caselaw interpreting the state’s public trust 
doctrine.116  Early in the state’s history, the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
 
110.  City of Milwaukee v. State, 193 Wis. 423, 449, 214 N.W. 820, 830 (1927) (“The trust 
reposed in the State is not a passive trust; it is governmental, active, and administrative.  
Representing the State in its legislative capacity, the legislature is fully vested with the power 
of control and regulation.”). 
111.  Id. at 449.  
112.  Bridget Donegan, Comment, The Great Lakes Compact and the Public Trust 
Doctrine: Beyond Michigan and Wisconsin Common Law, 24 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 455, 479 
(2009). 
113.  WIS. STAT. §§ 30.01–30.99 (2013–2014) (capitalization omitted). 
114.  ABKA Ltd. P’ship v. Wis. Dep’t of Natural Res., 2002 WI 106, ¶¶ 11–12, 255 Wis. 
2d 486, 648 N.W.2d 854.  
115.  WIS. STAT. §§ 31.01–31.99.  Of particular importance to the present discussion, 
Wisconsin Statutes section 31.02 delegates authority to the WDNR to regulate water levels in 
all navigable bodies of water.  The statute provides in relevant part that “[t]he department, in 
the interest of public rights in navigable waters or to promote safety and protect life, health 
and property may regulate and control the level and flow of water in all navigable waters.”  
Id. § 31.02(1). 
116.  Henquinet & Dobson, supra note 96, at 350 (indicating that “Wisconsin has not 
surprisingly entertained a substantial amount of public trust litigation” due to the prevalence 
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declared that “the state is the owner of the fee of all lands under 
navigable waters in the Great Lakes, but in trust only, for the public 
uses and purposes of navigation and fishing.”117  Of particular 
importance to the present discussion are a series of cases decided in the 
wake of this early pronouncement that clarified the scope of the state’s 
powers and duties under the public trust doctrine.118 
In Diana Shooting Club v. Husting, the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
addressed both the scope of the waters that the state holds in trust and 
the rights secured to the public in those waters.119  Diana Shooting Club 
involved an action for trespass against a hunter who had pushed his boat 
into vegetation growing on the plaintiff’s property while duck hunting 
on the Rock River.120  The defendant hunter maintained that he had 
remained on waters held in trust for the public and that such waters 
were held in trust not only for purposes of navigation, but also for 
hunting, fishing, and other recreational purposes.121  In holding that the 
defendant had not trespassed on the plaintiff’s property, the court 
declared that the waters held in trust by the state extend to the ordinary 
high-water marks on the shores or banks of any navigable body of 
water.122  The court defined “ordinary high-water mark” as “the point on 
the bank or shore up to which the presence and action of the water is so 
continuous as to leave a distinct mark either by erosion, destruction of 
terrestrial vegetation, or other easily recognized characteristic.”123  
 
of Great Lakes shoreline, inland lakes, and navigable rivers within the state); Sax, supra note 
11, at 509 (citing Wisconsin as among those states that have “the most amply developed case 
law in the public trust area”); Donegan, supra note 112, at 460 (stating that Wisconsin has 
“some of the richest law in the region concerning the public trust doctrine”).  
117.  McLennan v. Prentice, 85 Wis. 427, 443, 55 N.W. 764, 770 (1893). 
118.  Because the focus of this Comment is the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s decision in 
Rock-Koshkonong, a comprehensive overview of Wisconsin’s public trust caselaw is beyond 
the scope of the present discussion.  For a more complete treatment of Wisconsin cases 
addressing the public trust doctrine, see Craig, supra note 103, at 11–13 (outlining key cases 
addressing the public trust doctrine in Wisconsin); Donegan, supra note 112, at 478–84 
(discussing in detail the scope of Wisconsin’s public trust doctrine as defined through caselaw, 
including the state’s obligations as trustee, as well as citizen standing to enforce Wisconsin’s 
public trust doctrine).  For a thorough historical examination of earlier cases addressing the 
public trust doctrine in Wisconsin, see Sax, supra note 11, at 509–23. 
119.  156 Wis. 261, 272, 145 N.W. 816, 820 (1914).  
120.  Id. at 265. 
121.  Id.  
122.  Id. at 272. 
123.  Id. 
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The court in Diana Shooting Club further held that members of the 
public retain the right to hunt so long as they remain between the 
boundaries of the ordinary high-water marks.124  In reaching this 
conclusion, the court defined the rights preserved to the public under 
the public trust doctrine more broadly than navigation, commerce, and 
fishing: “[Navigable waters] should be free to all for commerce, for 
travel, for recreation, and also for hunting and fishing, which are now 
mainly certain forms of recreation.”125  The court reasoned that this 
broad interpretation was necessary to give effect to the purpose 
underlying the state’s public trust doctrine—to preserve to the public 
the “full and free use of public waters.”126  
While Diana Shooting Club thus expanded the rights preserved to 
the public under the public trust doctrine to include all recreational uses, 
Muench v. Public Service Commission similarly expanded the definition 
of “navigable waters” that fall within the scope of the state’s trust.127  
Muench addressed a challenge by a conservation group and private 
citizens to the Public Service Commission’s grant of approval for 
construction of a hydroelectric dam on the Namekagon River in 
Washburn County.128  In the context of this challenge, the Muench court 
defined “navigable waters” as any body of water “which is capable of 
floating any boat, skiff, or canoe, of the shallowest draft used for 
recreational purposes.”129  The court situated this definition in an 
extended discussion of the historical test for navigability, which turned 
on whether or not the body of water in question was usable for 
commercial purposes.130  In departing from this historical test, the court 
cited Diana Shooting Club and its expansion of the rights secured to the 
public under the public trust doctrine.131  Because Diana Shooting Club 
had interpreted the rights secured to the public in broad terms that 
 
124.  Id. (“Hunting on navigable waters is lawful when it is confined strictly to such 
waters while they are in a navigable stage, and between the boundaries of the ordinary high-
water marks.”). 
125.  Id. at 271. 
126.  Id. 
127.  Muench v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 261 Wis. 492, 506, 53 N.W.2d 514, 519 (1952). 
128.  Id. at 497–98. 
129.  Id. at 506. 
130.  Id. at 500–01 (discussing Wisconsin’s early use of the “saw-log” test for navigability 
and indicating that this test was based on “commercial considerations”).  
131.  Id. at 504–05 (“[Diana Shooting Club] is significant in that the navigability was 
established not through any commercial use, such as floating of logs, but through the use of 
shallow draft boats for purposes of recreation.”). 
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extended beyond mere navigation or fishing for commercial purposes, 
the test for navigability, the court reasoned, should likewise extend 
beyond navigability for commercial purposes.132  The court thus 
characterized its definition of “navigable waters” as “keeping with the 
trend manifested in the development of the law of navigable waters in 
this state to extend the rights of the general public to the recreational 
use of the waters of this state, and to protect the public in the enjoyment 
of such rights.”133  
Together, Diana Shooting Club and Muench clarify the scope of the 
state’s powers and duties under the public trust doctrine by defining two 
key elements of the doctrine: navigability and the rights preserved to the 
public in the state’s navigable waters.  After Diana Shooting Club and 
Muench, it is clear that, at a minimum, the state holds in trust for the 
public any body of water that is capable of floating any vessel used for 
recreational purposes, and that the state’s trust extends to the ordinary 
high-water marks of such bodies of water.134  Beyond merely clarifying 
these particular aspects of the public trust doctrine, however, both 
Diana Shooting Club and Muench set a course for expansive application 
of the doctrine.  Indicative of this course are several key cases decided in 
the decades following Diana Shooting Club and Muench, which rely on 
these earlier decisions to suggest that the public trust doctrine may 
apply to certain non-navigable bodies of water to protect public interests 
as varied as preventing pollution and preserving the state’s scenic 
beauty.  
More than two decades after Muench, in De Gayner & Co. v. 
Department of Natural Resources, the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
revisited the test for navigability.135  The court in De Gayner addressed 
the issue of whether a creek on which a developer sought to build a dam 
was navigable, which would in turn require the developer to obtain a 
permit prior to constructing the dam.136  The developer in this case was 
the sole riparian owner of the creek.137  Testimony by various individuals 
indicated that it was possible to traverse the creek by canoe due 
primarily to the presence of a number of beaver dams, which had the 
 
132.  Id. at 512. 
133.  Id. 
134.  See id. at 506. 
135.  De Gayner & Co. v. Dep’t of Natural Res., 70 Wis. 2d 936, 938, 236 N.W.2d 217, 
218 (1975). 
136.  Id. at 938–39. 
137.  Id. at 938. 
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effect of raising water levels on the creek.138  Accordingly, the developer 
argued that the creek was not navigable in its natural condition but only 
as a result of being altered by the beaver dams.139  In holding that the 
creek was in fact navigable, the court applied the test for navigability as 
outlined in Muench.140  The court further noted, “[T]here are no 
requirements in the Wisconsin law that only ‘normal or natural 
conditions’ are to be considered in determining navigability.”141  Rather, 
the court explained, artificial conditions may render a body of water 
navigable so long as those conditions have “existed for a period of 
time.”142 
While the court thus further clarified the test for navigability as 
established in Muench, the court also suggested that the “modern test” 
for navigability that Muench set forth may in fact be even broader than 
navigability per se.143  Specifically, the court noted that Muench had 
ultimately been remanded to the Public Service Commission for a 
determination of “whether public rights for the recreational enjoyment 
of the stream in its present natural condition outweigh the benefits to 
the public which would result in the construction of the dam.”144  On this 
basis, the court proposed that the test for applicability of the public trust 
doctrine under Muench might extend beyond navigability altogether: 
“Under that broader test foreshadowed by Muench, the question would 
appear to be whether any beneficial interest whatsoever of the public 
will be served by the continued existence of the original stream.”145 
In the same way that De Gayner revisited the question of 
navigability, Wisconsin’s Environmental Decade, Inc. v. Department of 
Natural Resources dealt once again with the question of what rights are 
preserved to the public under the public trust doctrine.146  Wisconsin’s 
Environmental Decade involved a city resolution that prohibited the use 
 
138.  Id. at 940–43. 
139.  Id. at 940–42. 
140.  Id. at 945 (noting that Muench “established the modern test of navigability” and 
applying that test to the facts of the present case). 
141.  Id. 
142.  Id. at 946. 
143.  Id. at 948–49 (“We are not, however, unmindful of the broad sweep of the modern 
test hinted at in Muench v. Public Service Comm.”).  
144.  Id. at 949 (quoting Muench v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 261 Wis. 492, 515b, 53 N.W.2d 
514, 525 (1952)) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
145.  De Gayner, 70 Wis. 2d at 949. 
146.  See Wisconsin’s Envtl. Decade, Inc. v. Dep’t of Natural Res., 85 Wis. 2d 518, 526, 
271 N.W.2d 69, 72–73 (1978).  
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of chemical treatments on lakes in Madison despite the WDNR’s 
issuance of a blanket permit allowing such treatments.147  The chemical 
treatments were intended to eliminate weeds in Lakes Mendota and 
Monona that made various recreational activities difficult and 
dangerous.148  The Wisconsin Supreme Court ultimately invalidated the 
city resolution.149  The court reasoned that, although the state legislature 
had delegated to the city the power to prohibit chemical treatments, that 
power was subject to any other statutory provisions limiting or 
withdrawing such power.150  Because Wisconsin Statutes section 
144.025(2) expressly authorized the WDNR to supervise chemical 
treatment of waters in the state, and because the city’s resolution was 
inconsistent with the WDNR’s order granting a permit in this case, the 
court held that the city’s power to issue such a resolution was effectively 
revoked.151 
Although Wisconsin’s Environmental Decade thus struck down a city 
resolution that provided more aggressive environmental protection 
because it conflicted with the legislative grant of authority to the 
WDNR, the decision is significant precisely because the court identified 
protection of natural resources as a public interest that the state is 
required to preserve under the public trust doctrine.152  The court noted 
that its earlier decisions had recognized recreational interests beyond 
commercial navigation and fishing.153  The court then went on to 
indicate that societal changes had created new interests over time:  
[I]ncreased leisure time, improved transportation facilities, the 
consequent growth of Wisconsin’s water-centered recreation 
industry, and the continued deterioration of the quality of the 
 
147.  Id. at 523. 
148.  Id. at 523–24. 
149.  Id. at 539. 
150.  Id. at 534. 
151.  Id. at 535. 
152.  See Henquinet & Dobson, supra note 96, at 351 (“Ironically, or perhaps wrongly, 
the court struck down a more protective environmental regulation by the City of Madison, 
because it conflicted with the authority delegated to the Wisconsin Department of Natural 
Resources as part of the affirmative duty of the State to protect the environment under the 
public trust doctrine.  Regardless, this is probably the most pro-environmental protection 
statement that one will find in the public trust doctrine decisions that apply to the Great 
Lakes.” (footnote omitted)). 
153.  Wisconsin’s Envtl. Decade, 85 Wis. 2d at 526 (acknowledging that the state’s public 
trust obligations “require[] the state not only to promote navigation but also to protect and 
preserve its waters for fishing, hunting, recreation, and scenic beauty”). 
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waters of the state have awakened widespread interest in all 
Wisconsin’s waters and have served to underscore the fact that 
maintaining pure and attractive rivers, lakes and streams is a 
matter of statewide concern.154 
On the basis of this analysis, the court concluded that “[p]reventing 
pollution and protecting the quality of the waters of the state are valid 
police-power concerns, as well as being part of the state’s affirmative 
duty under the ‘public trust’ doctrine.”155 
Thus, in the wake of Diana Shooting Club and Muench, the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court not only continued to clarify its definition of 
the public trust doctrine but furthermore suggested a much broader 
scope for the doctrine than its historical application to waters navigable 
for commercial purposes.  The public trust doctrine as articulated by the 
court in De Gayner and Wisconsin’s Environmental Decade would 
seemingly enable the state to regulate non-navigable waters to the 
extent necessary to protect public interests in the environmental well-
being and scenic beauty of the state’s natural resources.156  Nowhere is 
this potentially expansive scope of Wisconsin’s public trust doctrine 
more apparent than in the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s 1972 decision 
upholding a shoreland zoning ordinance in Just v. Marinette County. 
D. Just v. Marinette County 
In Just v. Marinette County, the Wisconsin Supreme Court addressed 
the issue of whether a shoreland zoning ordinance constituted a 
regulatory taking of private property requiring compensation.157  The 
county ordinance in question required property owners to obtain a 
permit prior to filling, draining, or dredging any wetlands within 1,000 
feet of a navigable lake or 300 feet of a navigable river.158  The Justs, 
who owned a parcel of designated wetlands adjacent to a navigable lake 
in Marinette County, challenged the ordinance after attempting to fill a 
portion of their property without the required permit.159  The Justs 
alleged that the ordinance amounted to a constructive taking of their 
 
154.  Id. 
155.  Id. at 533. 
156.  See supra Part III.C. 
157.  Just v. Marinette Cnty., 56 Wis. 2d 7, 9, 14, 201 N.W.2d 761, 764, 767 (1972). 
158.  Id. at 12. 
159.  Id. at 14. 
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private property by denying them all beneficial use of the wetland.160  
Marinette County and the State of Wisconsin argued, in turn, that the 
shoreland zoning ordinance constituted a reasonable exercise of the 
state’s police powers to protect navigable waters from the harmful 
effects of uncontrolled use and development of the shoreland.161  
The court in Just held that the Marinette County ordinance did not 
rise to the level of a taking requiring compensation.162  In reaching this 
conclusion, the court undertook a lengthy discussion of not only 
regulatory takings jurisprudence but also Wisconsin’s public trust 
doctrine.163  The court first highlighted the distinction between an 
exercise of the state’s police power (not requiring compensation) and an 
exercise of the government’s power of eminent domain (requiring 
compensation):  
The protection of public rights may be accomplished by the 
exercise of the police power unless the damage to the property 
owner is too great and amounts to a confiscation.  The securing 
or taking of a benefit not presently enjoyed by the public for its 
use is obtained by the government through its power of eminent 
domain.164 
The court then went on to consider whether preventing alterations to 
the natural condition of the state’s lakes and rivers constituted 
protection of public rights from harm or the securing of a benefit not 
presently enjoyed.165  Central to the court’s reasoning was its recognition 
of the interconnectedness of navigable bodies of water and adjacent, 
non-navigable wetlands.166  Specifically, the court expressly stated that 
its analysis would have been substantially different if the privately-
owned wetlands in question were not adjacent to a navigable lake: “This 
is not a case of an isolated swamp unrelated to a navigable lake or 
stream, the change of which would cause no harm to public rights.  
 
160.  See id.  
161.  Id.  
162.  Id. at 26 (holding that “the prohibition in the ordinance against the filling of 
wetlands is constitutional”). 
163.  See id. at 14–19. 
164.  Id. at 15.  
165.  Id. at 16. 
166.  Id. at 16–17 (“What makes this case different from most condemnation or police 
power zoning cases is the interrelationship of the wetlands, the swamps and the natural 
environment of shorelands to the purity of the water and to such natural resources as 
navigation, fishing, and scenic beauty.”).  
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Lands adjacent to or near navigable waters exist in a special relationship 
to the state.”167  Because changes to adjacent wetlands inevitably impact 
navigable lakes and rivers, the court explained, such changes necessarily 
implicate the public’s rights in the state’s navigable waters—as well as 
the state’s duty to protect and promote those rights—under the public 
trust doctrine.168  
Consequently, the public trust doctrine assumed a key role in the 
court’s reasoning.  Specifically, the court stated: “In the instant case we 
have a restriction on the use of a citizens’ property, not to secure a 
benefit for the public, but to prevent a harm from the change in the 
natural character of the citizens’ property.”169  The court then 
characterized prevention of such harm as a right presently enjoyed by 
the public under the state’s public trust doctrine:  
The state of Wisconsin under the trust doctrine has a duty to 
eradicate the present pollution and to prevent further pollution 
in its navigable waters.  This is not, in a legal sense, a gain or a 
securing of a benefit by the maintaining of the natural status quo 
of the environment.170 
Because the rights preserved to the public under the state’s public trust 
doctrine include the right to unpolluted navigable waters, a restriction 
on the use of private property intended to prevent despoliation of 
adjacent navigable waters constitutes an exercise of the state’s police 
power intended to prevent harm to rights currently enjoyed, as opposed 
to an exercise of the government’s power of eminent domain meant to 
secure new benefits for the public.171  On this basis, the court held that 
the county’s shoreland zoning ordinance constituted a valid exercise of 
the state’s police powers intended to prevent harm to public rights in the 
state’s navigable waters:  
The shoreland zoning ordinance preserves nature, the 
environment, and natural resources as they were created and to 
which the people have a present right.  The ordinance does not 
create or improve the public condition but only preserves nature 
 
167.  Id. at 18. 
168.  See id. at 16–17. 
169.  Id. at 16. 
170.  Id. 
171.  Id.  
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from the despoilage and harm resulting from the unrestricted 
activities of humans.172 
IV. A BREACH OF TRUST 
The foregoing examination leads to the conclusion that the Rock-
Koshkonong majority incorrectly characterized the court’s prior 
decisions as delimiting rather than expanding the scope of the state’s 
public trust doctrine.  In this respect, the dissent in Rock-Koshkonong 
set forth the more accurate portrayal of the court’s public trust 
precedents.  However, what both the majority and the dissent failed to 
recognize is that the underlying premise of the court’s opinion in Rock-
Koshkonong is an artificial distinction between the state’s exercise of its 
police powers and its affirmative duties under the public trust doctrine 
that is logically untenable within the context of the court’s holding in 
Just. 
A. A Mischaracterization of the Court’s Precedent 
The Rock-Koshkonong majority characterized the court’s public 
trust precedents as rigidly restricting the doctrine’s applicability to 
navigable bodies of water up to the ordinary high-water marks.173  In 
doing so, the majority relied on both Diana Shooting Club and Muench: 
the public trust doctrine, the majority explained, is “premised upon the 
existence of ‘navigable waters,’” which Muench defined as “navigable in 
fact for any purpose”174 and which Diana Shooting Club “confined to a 
limited geographic area” between the ordinary high-water marks on the 
bank or shore.175  This depiction of the court’s precedents is not 
incorrect; Diana Shooting Club and Muench did, in fact, define 
“navigable waters” as the Rock-Koshkonong majority described.176  
Nonetheless, the majority mischaracterized these cases as delimiting 
rather than expanding the scope of the state’s public trust doctrine.177  
 
172.  Id. at 23–24 (footnote omitted). 
173.  See supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
174.  Rock-Koshkonong Lake Dist. v. State Dep’t of Natural Res., 2013 WI 74, ¶ 76, 350 
Wis. 2d 45, 833 N.W.2d 800 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Muench v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 261 
Wis. 492, 505–06, 53 N.W.2d 514, 519 (1952)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
175.  Id. ¶ 91. 
176.  See supra Part III.C. 
177.  Rock-Koshkonong, 2013 WI 74, ¶ 93 (describing “the limitation thus stated in the 
cases” cited above (emphasis added)). 
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This interpretation is inconsistent not only with the language of 
Diana Shooting Club and Muench but also with the court’s previous 
readings of these cases.  In holding that hunting on navigable waters up 
to the ordinary high-water marks is a right secured to the public under 
the state’s public trust doctrine, the court in Diana Shooting Club 
expressly cautioned against a limiting construction of the doctrine: “The 
wisdom of the policy which, in the organic laws of our state, steadfastly 
and carefully preserved to the people the full and free use of public 
waters cannot be questioned.  Nor should it be limited or curtailed by 
narrow constructions.”178  Similarly, in defining “navigable waters” as 
waters navigable in fact for any recreational purpose, the Muench court 
was clearly conscious that it was not only altering but furthermore 
expanding prior definitions of navigability, which had focused on 
navigability for commercial purposes.179  The Muench court highlighted, 
for example, “the trend to extend and protect the rights of the public to 
the recreational enjoyment of the navigable waters of the state.”180 
Later decisions reinforce the assertion that Diana Shooting Club and 
Muench sought to expand rather than delimit the scope of Wisconsin’s 
public trust doctrine through their definition of “navigable waters.”181 
The Rock-Koshkonong majority’s mischaracterization of these decisions 
is more pronounced.  Specifically, the majority cited De Gayner in 
support of the proposition that the “court has rejected theories that 
attempt[ed] to extend the public trust doctrine beyond its historical 
limitations.”182  The majority went on to state that De Gayner “rejected 
a theory offered by an amicus that a stream should be considered ‘as a 
navigable water [irrespective of any other finding], because it is a 
tributary of a natural and valuable navigable resource, the Namekagon 
river.’”183 
This description entirely ignores the De Gayner court’s 
consideration of the implications of the new test for navigability that 
Muench established.184  As the De Gayner court expressly noted, “[I]t 
 
178.  Diana Shooting Club v. Husting, 156 Wis. 261, 271, 145 N.W. 816, 820 (1914). 
179.  See supra Part III.C. 
180.  Muench v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 261 Wis. 492, 508, 53 N.W.2d 514, 521 (1952) 
(emphasis added). 
181.  See supra Part III.C.  
182.  Rock-Koshkonong, 2013 WI 74, ¶ 77 n.29.   
183.  Id. (alteration in original) (quoting De Gayner & Co. v. Dep’t of Natural Res., 70 
Wis. 2d 936, 948, 236 N.W.2d 217, 223 (1975)).  
184.  See supra Part III.C.  
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appears, under Muench, that navigability, i.e., the ability to float a skiff 
of even the lightest nature, ought not to be the sole test to be applied in 
determining whether natural beauty should be supplanted by some man-
made project.”185  The De Gayner court went on to describe the broader 
test of navigability that Muench foreshadowed as “whether any 
beneficial interest whatsoever of the public will be served by the 
continued existence of the original stream.”186  Under this test, the De 
Gayner court stated, the position urged in the amicus brief would have 
“great merit.”187  Although the De Gayner court ultimately declined to 
apply this “broader test of navigability,” it did so because the parties to 
the case had agreed to the more traditional test of navigability at the 
outset of the dispute.188  In this context, the De Gayner court can hardly 
be said to have “rejected theories that attempt[ed] to extend the public 
trust doctrine beyond its historical limitations,” as the majority in Rock-
Koshkonong contended.189  To the contrary, the De Gayner court clearly 
recognized and even highlighted the potential implications of the court’s 
decision in Muench to expand the scope of the public trust doctrine 
beyond its historical applicability to navigable waters.190 
Thus, while the Rock-Koshkonong majority’s treatment of caselaw 
defining “navigable waters” is perhaps technically accurate, the court 
mischaracterized the general thrust of its precedents in this area.  
Consequently, the majority arrived at a conception of Wisconsin’s public 
trust doctrine that cannot accommodate any regulation of non-navigable 
waters pursuant to the state’s public trust jurisdiction.191 
B. A Misunderstanding of Just v. Marinette County 
This newly rigid interpretation of Wisconsin’s public trust doctrine 
led the majority to construe Just v. Marinette County as a “textbook 
 
185.  De Gayner, 70 Wis. 2d at 949. 
186.  Id.  
187.  Id.  
188.  Id. at 949–50 (“That position is, however, more properly tested in subsequent 
proceedings to determine whether a permit to obstruct the stream should be granted.  It is not 
embraced in the traditional concept of ‘navigability,’ which the parties agreed at the outset 
was the only one to be considered in these declaratory proceedings.”). 
189.  Rock-Koshkonong Lake Dist. v. State Dep’t of Natural Res., 2013 WI 74, ¶ 77 
n.29, 350 Wis. 2d 45, 833 N.W.2d 800. 
190.  See supra Part III.C. 
191.  Rock-Koshkonong, 2013 WI 74, ¶ 86 (“There is no constitutional foundation for 
public trust jurisdiction over land, including non-navigable wetlands, that is not below the 
[ordinary high-water marks] of a navigable lake or stream.” (emphasis omitted)). 
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example” of the state’s exercise of its police powers entirely detached 
from the state’s public trust jurisdiction.192  The majority reasoned that 
the court in Just could not have upheld the shoreland zoning ordinance 
at issue in that case under the public trust doctrine because the 
shoreland in question did not constitute a navigable body of water as 
defined in earlier cases.193  As the dissent noted, the majority’s reasoning 
has a circular quality that is clearly problematic.194  Even more 
problematic is the fact that “[t]he clear language of Just rebuts the 
majority’s conclusion” that the Just court did not rely on the public trust 
doctrine.195  The court in Just expressly cited “the active public trust duty 
of the state of Wisconsin in respect to navigable waters” that “requires 
the state not only to promote navigation but also to protect and preserve 
those waters for fishing, recreation, and scenic beauty.”196  Nonetheless, 
the Rock-Koshkonong majority was, again, not incorrect in noting that 
Just upheld the shoreland zoning ordinance at issue in that case as a 
valid exercise of the state’s police power; indeed, the Just court explicitly 
stated: “Wisconsin has long held that laws and regulations to prevent 
pollution and to protect the waters of this state from degradation are 
valid police-power enactments.”197   
That both the majority and the dissent were able to point to specific 
language in Just in support of their conflicting conclusions highlights the 
fundamental problem underlying both opinions: failure to recognize that 
the public trust doctrine was inseparable from and essential to the 
court’s holding in Just that the shoreland zoning ordinance at issue 
constituted a valid exercise of the state’s police powers.  It is worth 
emphasizing here that Just was particularly noteworthy at the time it 
was decided in part because courts in other states had, around the same 
time, struck down similar ordinances as unconstitutional takings of 
 
192.  Id. ¶ 95–96 (“This review of the constitutionally based public trust doctrine does 
not disarm the DNR in protecting Wisconsin’s valuable water resources.  For instance, the 
DNR has broad statutory authority grounded in the state’s police power to protect wetlands 
and other water resources.”) (citing Just v. Marinette Cnty., 56 Wis. 2d 7, 10, 201 N.W.2d 761, 
765 (1972)).  
193.  See supra notes 73–75 and accompanying text.  
194.  See Rock-Koshkonong, 2013 WI 74, ¶ 171 (Crooks, J., dissenting) (“The majority 
imports its conclusion from earlier in the opinion—that the public trust does not extend 
beyond the ordinary high water mark—and applies it to support its subsequent conclusion.”). 
195.  Id. ¶ 170. 
196.  Just, 56 Wis. 2d. at 18. 
197.  Id. 
 2015] A BREACH OF TRUST 1499 
private property.198  By contrast, the Just court upheld the ordinance at 
issue against the plaintiffs’ takings claim based on the public trust 
doctrine.199  Because Wisconsin’s public trust doctrine recognizes a 
public interest in the enjoyment of unpolluted navigable waters and 
because navigable waters are inextricably connected to adjacent, non-
navigable wetlands, the court in Just concluded that the shoreland 
zoning ordinance at issue did not restrict the use of private property to 
secure new benefits for the public but rather to prevent harm to a right 
currently enjoyed.200 
In this respect, the court in Just can be said to have anticipated the 
notion of the public trust doctrine as a governmental defense to a 
takings claim,201 a notion that has garnered significant attention since the 
United States Supreme Court’s decision in Lucas v. South Carolina 
Coastal Council.202  In Lucas, the Supreme Court recognized that 
regulations duplicating restrictions imposed by “background principles 
of the State’s law of property and nuisance” will not constitute a taking, 
even where the regulation results in a complete deprivation of all 
beneficial use of the property.203  Foremost among the background 
principles that scholars and courts have looked to in the wake of Lucas 
 
198.  See Patrick O. Dunphy, The Public Trust Doctrine, 59 MARQ. L. REV. 787, 789 n.12 
(1976). 
199.  See Just, 56 Wis. 2d. at 18; see also Alexandra B. Klass, Property Rights on the New 
Frontier: Climate Change, Natural Resource Development, and Renewable Energy, 38 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 63, 89 (2011) (noting that the court in Just rejected the plaintiff’s takings 
claim in holding that regulation at issue “was a valid exercise of the police power based on the 
public trust doctrine”). 
200.  See supra notes 166–68 and accompanying text; see also Klass, supra note 199, at 89 
(highlighting the Just court’s reliance on the public trust doctrine based on “the 
interrelationship between preserving the natural status of wetlands and preventing pollution 
of navigable waters”); Sarahan, supra note 14, at 568 (describing the Just court as “approving 
wetlands regulations premised on the physical interrelationship between the wetlands and the 
public trust lands”).   
201.  See Klass, supra note 103, at 739 (citing Just as an early example of the “idea of the 
public trust as a background limitation on private property rights”); Dave Owen, The Mono 
Lake Case, the Public Trust Doctrine, and the Administrative State, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
1099, 1119–20 & n.128 (2012) (identifying the public trust doctrine as a possible defense 
against a takings claim where the government engages in environmental protection 
regulation, and citing Just as an early example of the use of the doctrine for this purpose); 
Carol M. Rose, Joseph Sax and the Idea of the Public Trust, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 351, 358–59 
(1998) (discussing the public trust doctrine as a governmental defense against takings claims 
and noting that a “trace of this idea appeared in Just v. Marinette County”). 
202.  505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
203.  Id. at 1029. 
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is the public trust doctrine.204  The basic contours of the doctrine as a 
defense to a regulatory takings claim have been clearly articulated: to 
the extent that the public trust doctrine prohibits harm to resources held 
in trust for the public, any regulation that functions to prohibit such 
harm cannot constitute a taking.205  Restated in these terms, the court in 
Just upheld the shoreland zoning ordinance against the plaintiffs’ 
takings claim because the regulation was intended to prevent harm to 
adjacent navigable waters; insofar as the public trust doctrine prohibited 
such harm, the regulation did not constitute a taking.206 
While the scope and viability of the public trust doctrine as a 
governmental defense to a takings claim remains unsettled,207 the 
 
204.  See Michael C. Blumm & Lucus Ritchie, Lucas’s Unlikely Legacy: The Rise of 
Background Principles as Categorical Takings Defenses, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 321, 342 
(2005); Klass, supra note 103, at 740–41; Timothy M. Bagshaw, Note, Unintended 
Consequences: Lucas, The Public Trust Doctrine, and the Erosion of Private Property Rights 
Under the Takings Clause, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 1687, 1688–89; Julia K. Bramley, Note, 
Supreme Foresight: Judicial Takings, Regulatory Takings, and the Public Trust Doctrine, 38 
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 445, 455–56 (2011).  
205.  Callies & Breemer, supra note 103, at 369 (“If otherwise confiscatory regulations 
avoid the compensation requirement as should common law limitations, traditional custom 
and public trust are clearly appropriate candidates for identification as categorical takings 
exceptions.”); John D. Echeverria, The Public Trust Doctrine as a Background Principles 
Defense in Takings Litigation, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 931, 955 (2012) (“Because no water 
right holder can claim an entitlement to exercise its water right in a fashion that harms public 
trust resources, a regulation designed to prevent such harm does not impair a protected 
property right and, therefore, cannot provide the basis for a successful takings claim.”). 
206.  Some commentators have explicitly framed the Just decision in these terms, see 
Sarahan, supra note 14, at 568–69, while others have asserted more generally that the Lucas 
background principles defense applies where the government seeks to protect public trust 
resources by regulating adjacent, privately-owned property, see Archer & Stone, supra note 
14, at 113. 
207.  Although the Supreme Court in Lucas provided minimal guidance regarding what 
constitutes a “background principle,” the general consensus among scholars appears to be 
that the public trust doctrine should provide a defense to a takings claim under Lucas.  See 
Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 204, at 343–44 (“Therefore, in states that have adopted an 
expansive view of public rights, the public trust doctrine can be effectively used as a defense 
to takings claims in a variety of situations.”); Callies & Breemer, supra note 103, at 372–73 
(“It is fair to say that states can, therefore, prohibit land uses inconsistent with the traditional 
public trust without paying just compensation.”); Echeverria, supra note 205, at 955 
(“[C]ourts should readily acknowledge that the public trust doctrine provides a background 
principles defense to a takings claim based on regulatory restrictions on the use of water 
designed to protect fish or other trust resources from harm.”).  Nonetheless, commentators 
recognize that the scope of the public trust doctrine varies widely from state to state, and 
there remains significant disagreement regarding the extent to which the doctrine should 
provide a defense to a takings claim.  See Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 204, at 343 
(acknowledging gradual expansion of the public trust doctrine beyond its traditional scope 
but asserting that Lucas permits evolution of background principles); Callies & Bremmer at 
 
 2015] A BREACH OF TRUST 1501 
general framework illustrates the fundamental illogic of distinguishing 
between regulation pursuant to the public trust doctrine and regulation 
pursuant to the state’s police powers within the context of the Just 
decision.  Toward the end of its discussion of Just, the Rock-
Koshkonong majority attempted to establish a clear distinction between 
the state’s public trust jurisdiction and its police powers, describing the 
latter as “subject to constitutional and statutory protections afforded to 
property.”208  What both the majority and the dissent failed to recognize 
is that this distinction is untenable when applied to the type of shoreland 
regulation at issue in Rock-Koshkonong and upheld by the court in Just.  
Put differently, the Just court upheld the state’s exercise of its police 
powers against the “constitutional and statutory protections afforded to 
property” because Wisconsin’s public trust doctrine not only allowed 
but compelled the state to protect and promote the public’s interest in 
adjacent navigable waters.209  
A proper understanding of the relationship between the state’s 
public trust jurisdiction and its police powers renders unfounded the 
majority’s concern that reliance on the public trust doctrine to regulate 
non-navigable wetlands would call into question the private ownership 
of such wetlands.  As the dissent pointed out, and as Just itself made 
clear, regulation of non-navigable bodies of water pursuant to the public 
trust doctrine does not assert state ownership.210  Rather, such regulation 
merely recognizes the interconnectedness of the state’s water resources 
and, consequently, the state’s occasional need to restrict some uses of 
private property in order to fulfill its affirmative obligations as trustee of 
the state’s navigable waters under the public trust doctrine.211 
 
357, 372–73 (citing state court expansion of the geographic and substantive scope of the 
public trust doctrine over the last three decades and arguing that the doctrine as a defense to 
a takings claim should be limited to its more traditional, historical scope); Echeverria, supra 
note 205, at 951, 954–55 (noting that “the actual contours of the [public trust] doctrine remain 
somewhat uncertain” but concluding that these distinctions are largely irrelevant in the 
context of a takings claim). 
208.  Rock-Koshkonong Lake Dist. v. State Dep’t of Natural Res., 2013 WI 74, ¶ 101, 
350 Wis. 2d 45, 833 N.W.2d 800. 
209.  See supra Part III.D.  
210.  See Rock-Koshkonong, 2013 WI 74, ¶ 173 (Crooks, J., dissenting); Just v. 
Marinette Cnty., 56 Wis. 2d 7, 16, 201 N.W.2d 761, 767 (1972) (noting that the dispute in this 
case “causes us to reexamine the concepts of public benefit in contrast to public harm and the 
scope of an owner’s right to use of his property” (emphasis added)). 
211.  Just, 56 Wis. 2d at 18 (“This is not a case of an isolated swamp unrelated to a 
navigable lake or stream . . . which would cause no harm to public rights.  Lands adjacent to 
or near navigable waters exist in a special relationship to the state.”).   
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V. THE FUTURE OF WISCONSIN’S PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE 
In the wake of the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s decision in Rock-
Koshkonong, reactions have been mixed.  While business lobbying 
groups have praised the decision as clarifying “a lot of ambiguity that 
has resulted over the years in case law,” environmental advocates have 
raised concerns that the decision “backtrack[s] on [Wisconsin’s] . . . 
strong history” of protecting its waters as a public resource.212  Reactions 
within the legal community have been similarly equivocal.  While there 
appears to be a general consensus that the majority’s interpretation of 
Just represents a notable departure from previous interpretations,213 
commentators have disagreed on what the long-term implications of the 
Rock-Koshkonong decision will be.  Specifically, while some have 
described the decision as “a significant reversal in thinking by one of the 
most traditionally protective states in terms of an environmental public 
trust doctrine,”214 others have noted that the court’s commentary on the 
public trust doctrine in Rock-Koshkonong is largely dicta that future 
courts are not required to follow.215 
The extent to which the Rock-Koshkonong decision might lead to 
Wisconsin courts refusing to uphold regulation of non-navigable waters 
pursuant to the state’s public trust jurisdiction cannot be known, and the 
point that Rock-Koshkonong did not actually overturn any of the court’s 
public trust precedents is an important one.  Nonetheless, to discount 
the Rock-Koshkonong majority’s characterization of these precedents as 
 
212.  See Marley, supra note 7 (quoting Scott Manley, vice president of government 
relations for Wisconsin Manufacturers & Commerce, and Elizabeth Wheeler, an attorney 
with Clean Wisconsin).  
213.  See Scanlan, supra note 8 (discussing the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s decision in 
Just and the Rock-Koshkonong majority’s extensive commentary reinterpreting this 
decision); Robin Kundis Craig, Wisconsin Backs off Its Public Trust Doctrine, ENVTL. L. 
PROF BLOG (Aug. 12, 2013), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/environmental_law/2013/08/wi
sconsin-backs-off-its-public-trust-doctrine.html, archived at http://perma.cc/5MDK-5ZQ8 
(indicating that “the Rock-Koshkonong majority reinterpreted a classic public trust doctrine 
case, Just v. Marinette County, to be a police power case” (citations omitted)).  But see Mary 
Beth Peranteau & William P. O’Connor, Public Trust and Agency Discretion Principles Intact, 
WIS. LAW., Mar. 2014, at 34, 35 (asserting that the Rock-Koshkonong decision is “consistent 
with a long line of cases that limit the scope of delegated authority under separation-of-
powers principles”). 
214.  Craig, supra note 213. 
215.  Scanlan, supra note 8 (“[T]he muddying of the water on public trust jurisprudence 
should not be overblown.  As this reasoning was unnecessary to the outcome of the decision, 
it can be properly characterized as dicta that future courts aren’t bound to follow.” (emphasis 
omitted)). 
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confusing but harmless dicta is to ignore what has been the true 
hallmark of Wisconsin’s public trust doctrine: the doctrine’s particular 
“elasticity,”216 which has allowed Wisconsin courts to “continually 
expand[] what they recognize as the public’s interest in public trust 
resources to include everything from the right to hunt to the right to 
maintain pollution-free water.”217  As early as 1927, the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court itself recognized this “elastic” quality of the state’s 
public trust doctrine, stating, “The term ‘navigation’ itself in its 
definition is quite as indefinite and shifting as the so-called trust title.”218  
Later courts have seized upon this notion and consistently demonstrated 
a willingness to redefine key concepts such as navigability and public 
rights in the state’s navigable waters as societal needs and values have 
changed.219 
As recently as 2011, the Wisconsin Supreme Court availed itself of 
the particular adaptability of the state’s public trust doctrine in 
upholding the WDNR’s authority to regulate drilling of a high capacity 
well pursuant to the state’s public trust jurisdiction.220  In Lake Beulah 
Management District v. State Department of Natural Resources, the court 
addressed the question of whether the WDNR, in issuing drilling 
permits, could consider the environmental impact that a municipal well 
with a capacity of 1.4 million gallons per day would have on Lake 
Beulah, a navigable body of water located 1,200 feet from the site of the 
proposed well.221  In holding that the WDNR possessed authority to 
consider the environmental impact of the proposed well, the court in 
Lake Beulah identified the state’s public trust doctrine as the source of 
that authority.222  More specifically, the court relied implicitly on the 
notion—first recognized in Just223—that the state’s water resources are 
interconnected, and that the state’s affirmative duty to protect its 
navigable waters under the public trust doctrine necessarily requires 
some regulation of non-navigable waters such as the underground water 
 
216.  Melissa K. Scanlan, Implementing the Public Trust Doctrine: A Lakeside View into 
the Trustees’ World, 39 ECOLOGY L.Q. 123, 129 (2012). 
217.  See Scanlan, supra note 10, at 137. 
218.  City of Milwaukee v. State, 193 Wis. 423, 446–47, 214 N.W. 820, 829 (1927). 
219.  See supra Parts III.C–D. 
220.  See Lake Beulah Mgmt. Dist. v. State Dep’t of Natural Res., 2011 WI 54, ¶ 3, 335 
Wis. 2d 47, 799 N.W.2d 73. 
221.  Id. ¶¶ 9–10, 12, 30.  
222.  Id. ¶ 62.  
223.  See supra Part III.D. 
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at issue in this case.224  In the wake of the Rock-Koshkonong decision, 
the court’s continued willingness to extend the public trust doctrine in a 
similar fashion is at best questionable and at worst foreclosed by the 
decision’s ossification of the doctrine’s scope. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In the context of the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s public trust 
precedents, the most notable feature of the Rock-Koshkonong decision 
is its re-casting of the state’s public trust doctrine as static and settled, 
with clearly delineated boundaries.  As certain proponents of the 
decision have noted, perhaps with unintentional insight, “[T]he decision 
creates a bright line that makes clear the public trust doctrine applies 
only to navigable waterways.”225  While those who contend that Rock-
Koshkonong does not overturn any of the court’s public trust precedents 
are correct, they fail to consider fully the implications of the case going 
forward.  By subtly re-characterizing the court’s precedents as delimiting 
rather than expanding the state’s public trust jurisdiction, the Rock-
Koshkonong decision undermines the particular adaptability of 
Wisconsin’s public trust doctrine, which has allowed the doctrine to 
evolve along with societal values and public needs and which, for 
decades, has situated Wisconsin as a leader in using the public trust 
doctrine for environmental protection.  After Rock-Koshkonong, the 
state’s future as a leader in this area appears as unsettled as the ongoing 
dispute over those seven inches of water on Lake Koshkonong.   
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224.  See Lake Beulah, 2011 WI 54, ¶ 34 (noting that “the legislature has delegated the 
State’s public trust duties to the DNR in the context of its regulation of high capacity wells 
and their potential effect on navigable waters such as Lake Beulah” (emphasis added)).  For 
additional discussion of the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s prior willingness to continually 
expand the scope of the state’s public trust jurisdiction in light of the interconnectedness of 
the state’s water resources, see Scanlan, supra note 216, at 138–40 (noting that “[t]he extent 
to which Wisconsin’s public trust doctrine influences state management of additional, 
nonnavigable, artificial, or underground water is based on the interactions between these 
waters and navigable waters”).  
225.  See Marley, supra note 7 (citing Scott Manley, vice president of government 
relations for Wisconsin Manufacturers & Commerce). 
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